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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2A-3(f) (1953).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue for review is whether the trial court abused
its discretion by not granting the defendant's several motions
for a mistrial.

The issue was preserved for review in several

different parts of the transcript.

(Tr. at 80 - 90), (Tr. at

133-141), (Tr. at 149 - 153), (Tr. at 196 - 201).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard
pursuant to State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (See Appendix 1 ) .
Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (See Appendix 2 ) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves the alleged sale of approximately oneeighth of an ounce of marijuana by defendants to a confidential
informant.

1

B.

Proceedings Below.

The information in this matter was filed on July 21, 1993.
(R. at 7 ) . Preliminary hearing was held on August 6, 1993.
Defendant was bound over to district court.
trial was held on May 4, 1994.
convicted.

(R. at 30).

Jury

(R. at 185). Defendant was

Judgment, sentence, order suspending execution of

sentence, and the order of probation were entered on July 22,
1994.

(R. at 214). Notice of appeal was filed on August 1,

1994.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At trial, a confidential informant Melva Palmasano testified
that on July 13, 1993, she purchased 1/8 of an ounce of marijuana
from the defendant.

(Tr. at 205, 208-210).

In his opening

statement, the prosecutor referred to a criminal act purportedly
committed by the defendant but still pending in another case.
(Tr. at 80). Trial defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the
basis that the statement prejudiced the defendant.

(Tr. at 8 0 ) .

The trial judge admonished the prosecutor to limit his remarks,
but denied the motion for a mistrial.

(Tr. at 90-91).

Later in the trial, the prosecutor elicited hearsay
testimony of a police officer that the defendant was selling
marijuana to minors, which was not alleged in the current charge,
nor had it been charged separately.
again moved for a mistrial.

(Tr. at 135). The defense

(Tr. at 135).

The court admonished

the prosecutor to stay away from such areas as it was immaterial
2

and also bordering on prejudicial.

(Tr. at 139-140).

The court

struck the testimony from the record and ordered the jury to
disregard the statement.
mistrial was denied.

(Tr. at 140). The second motion for a

(Tr. at 139).

The prosecutor then elicited testimony from the officer
wherein the officer testified that a transcript of a tape of the
alleged transaction between the informant and the defendant
existed.

(Tr. at 149). The defense moved for a mistrial on the

basis that the prosecutor had indicated that he would not use
tapes or transcripts.

(Tr. at 149-152).

Neither tapes nor

transcripts had been given to the defense prior to trial, and the
prosecution and defense counsel had agreed that tapes would not
be used.

(Tr. at 149-152).

The court stated that reference to

transcripts under the circumstances was prejudicial and ordered
the prosecutor not to refer to them again.
third motion for a mistrial was denied.

(Tr. at 153). The

(Tr. at 153).

Finally, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the
confidential informant to the effect that she, her husband,
defendant, and defendant's husband had all been charged with
selling drugs previously, but that defendant and defendant's
husband were continuing to sell.

(Tr. at 196-197).

There was

also an inference that defendant and defendant's husband had
previously been arrested.

(Tr. at 196-197) .

This statement,

besides being prejudicial, was untrue as defendant had never been
previously arrested.

(Tr. at 197). Defendant's fourth motion

for a mistrial was denied.

(Tr. at 201-202).
3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal is based on four instances of error which
occurred during the trial.

The first error occurred during the

opening statement of the prosecution.

The prosecutor indicated

that the defendant was planning a trip to California to buy
drugs.

(Tr. at 80). This trip, and the contraband allegedly

purchased on the trip were the subject of a separate action then
pending in another division of the Fourth District Court.

(Tr.

at 81). This trip occurred after the alleged sale of marijuana
which is the subject of this action.

(Tr. at 86) .

moved for a mistrial on the basis of prejudice.

Trial counsel

(Tr. at 80).

The second error occurred when the prosecutor elicited
hearsay testimony from a police officer that the defendant was
selling marijuana to minors, a crime of which the defendant has
never been accused.
mistrial.

(Tr. at 135). The defense moved for a

(Tr. at 135). The court struck the testimony from the

record and ordered the jury to disregard the statement.
140-141) .

The motion for a mistrial was denied.

(Tr. at

(Tr. at 139) .

The third error occurred when the prosecutor elicited
testimony from an officer wherein the officer testified that a
transcript of a tape between the informant and the defendant
existed.

(Tr. at 149). The defense moved for a mistrial on the

basis that the prosecutor had indicated prior to trial that he
would not use tapes or transcripts.

(Tr. at 149-152).

Neither

tapes nor transcripts had been timely given to the defense.
at 149-152) .
4

(Tr.

The final error occurred when the prosecutor elicited
testimony from the confidential informant that defendant and her
husband had been arrested for selling drugs previously, and that
they were continuing to sell.

(Tr. at 196-197).

motion for a mistrial was denied.

Defendant's

(Tr. at 201) .

Each of the instances of error standing alone constitutes
sufficient grounds for reversal and remand.

Each of the

instances gave the jury information which was prejudicial to
defendant, and which tended to persuade the jury to convict the
defendant for bad character rather than basing the conviction on
the evidence.
The errors are particularly harmful in this case where usual
procedures were not followed in setting up this alleged drug
transaction.
searched.

The confidential informant and her husband were not

The premises were not searched.

(Tr. at 167). Money

was not given by the police to the confidential informants with
which to purchase the contraband.

(Tr. at 220). The

confidential informant was facing charges at the time.
215).

(Tr. at

The confidential informant admitted having lied to the

same police officers on another occasion.

(Tr. at 223, 244).

The confidential informant was eventually paid for her testimony.
(Tr. at 220-221).
The defense strategy at trial was to damage the credibility
of the confidential informant and make the jury believe that she
may have fabricated the story.

The Confidential informant's

credibility was damaged, and without the additional damage which
5

came from the improper evidence and statement, defendant may not
have been convicted.

Because of the exposure of the jury to

prejudicial comments and evidence, confidence in the verdict is
undermined.

This action should therefore be reversed and

remanded.

ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
There are three similar standards of review in the case at

bar even though the only issue on appeal involves a failure to
grant mistrials.

In two of the three situations the standard is

abuse of discretion.

The other standard is bifurcated standard.

Part of the determination is reviewed for correctness and the
balance on a clearly erroneous standard. The slight differences
in application of these standards are based on the differences in
the specific claimed errors.
The first motion for a mistrial in the case at bar was for
a situation involving a prejudicial statement made by the
prosecutor during his opening remarks.
an abuse of discretion standard.

The standard of review is

In State v. Speer, 750 P.2d

186, 190 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we must
determine if the prosecutor's remarks calls to the attention
of the jurors matters they would not be justified in
considering in reaching the verdict and, if so whether there
is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced
the jury that there would have been a more favorable result
absent the misconduct. State v. Tillman, 72 Utah Adv. Rep.
6 (Dec. 22 1987); State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 36 (Utah
1984). In determining whether a remark or question by the
prosecution had such an effect, the alleged misconduct must
6

be viewed in light of the totality of the trial. No one is
in a more advantageous position to view the incident in the
context of the trial judge; therefore, his rulings on
whether the conduct of the prosecution warranted a mistrial
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State
v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 370, 517 P.2d 1322 1324 (Utah
1974).
The second standard of review is one which is bifurcated
and is based on admission of evidence under rules 403 and 404 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Admission of evidence under Rule 404

(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is a question of law which must
be reviewed for correctness.

The subsidiary factual

determinations are given deference and are reversed only where
clearly erroneous.
Because the admission of evidence under Rule 404 (b) is a
question "of law, it is reviewed for correctness. However,
the trial court's subsidiary factual determinations should
be given deference by the appellate court and only be
overruled when they are clearly erroneous." State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991) (citation
omitted; see also State v. Thurman No. 910494, slip of. at
17-19 n. 11 (Utah Jan. 7. 1993) (recognizing bifurcated
standard when appeals court reviews underlying factual
findings). When reviewing a trial court's balancing of the
probativeness of a piece of evidence against its potential
for unfair prejudice under Rule 403, we reverse only if the
court's decision as a matter of law "was beyond the limits
of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240
(Utah 1992) . Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal
of a conviction only where we conclude there is a
"'reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings.'" Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240 (quoting
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).
State v. O'Niel, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993).
The final standard of review deals with violations of Rule
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Complaints that a

trial court failed to order a requested remedy, or that the
remedy ordered was insufficient to obviate the harm from the
7

violation are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918, 919 (Utah 1987).

II.

THE PROSECUTION MADE PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS IN OPENING
ARGUMENT.
As set forth in the "Statement of Facts" above, defendant in

this matter is only accused of the sale of a single baggie
containing approximately 1/8 of an ounce of marijuana.

Despite

this fact, the prosecutor in his opening remarks made the
following statement:
MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. Melva Palmasano provided Officer
Tompkin with information about a trip that Donna Day was
intending to make to California to pick up controlled
substances.
(Tr. at 80).
At that point, trial counsel made a motion for a mistrial on the
basis that the statement regarding obtaining controlled
substances in California was prejudicial and was the subject of
another case before another judge.

The motion for mistrial was

denied but the prosecution was ordered to "Stay away from the
California Trip except only as to the conversation."
91) .

(Tr. at 90,

The alleged drug transaction which is the subject of this

action occurred in its entirety prior to the trip to California.
Because the above statement was made by the prosecutor prior
to the introduction of any evidence, it must be analyzed in the
context of prosecutorial misconduct.
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is,
did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters
which they would not be justified in considering in
8

determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks.
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d at 60, 513 P.2d at 426. See also
State v. Johnson, Utah, 663 P.2d 48 (1983); State v.
Gaxiola, Utah, 550 P.2d 1298 (1976). Thus it is a two-step
test that must be applied "under the circumstances of the
particular case. . . . "
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984).
The statement by the prosecutor was prejudicial to the
defendant.

In the case at bar, defendant was charged with

selling a single baggie of marijuana.

The statement of the

prosecutor tended to point out to the jury the notion that the
defendant was a large distributor of narcotics, and that she was
traveling out of state to make drug purchases.

This statement

had to have the effect of inflaming the jury and creating
prejudice against the defendant.
In oral argument on the motion for a mistrial the prosecutor
argued that the allegations regarding the trip to California to
purchase drugs were an integral part of the transaction in
question.

Essentially, the State was arguing that the

information regarding the trip to California was necessary for
foundation.

(Tr. at 82, 83). This argument is without merit.

All of the necessary foundation for the transaction in question
could have been laid without any reference to the alleged plan to
purchase drugs.

All that was needed was a statement that the

defendant was planning a trip to California.
To determine whether improper statements by counsel merit
reversal, a two part test must be applied.

The test is found in

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984), as set forth above.
9

Application of the first prong of the test set forth in Troy is
simple.

The first prong is to consider whether the remarks of

the prosecutor called to the jurors attention information which
they would not be justified in considering in reaching their
decision.
Clearly the jurors would not be justified in considering
whether the defendant planned or later took a trip to California
to purchase drugs in determining whether defendant sold marijuana
to the confidential informant some time prior to the California
trip.

The reference to obtaining illegal drugs in California is

absolutely unnecessary for foundation.
The prosecutor could have told the jurors simply that a trip
was planned, but without stating the purpose of the trip.

The

reference to the trip to California to purchase illegal drugs
does not go to the elements of the crime charged.

Tho only

purposes for the remarks by the prosecutor were to demonstrate to
the jury that defendant had a bad character, and to prejudice and
inflame the jury.
The improper remarks in the case at bar are in many ways
similar to the remarks made by the prosecution in Troy.

In Troy,

the prosecutor called to the attention of the jury allegations of
other crimes, and other bad behavior.

In analyzing the facts of

the Troy case, the court stated:
Applying step one, we see that the prosecutor was clearly
calling attention to matters outside the evidence in
referring to defendant's alias, his being a federal witness,
and his being involved in 'various criminal matters' and in
comparing him to 'criminals [who] have all kinds of
irrational behavior.... Hinckley is a classic example.' In
10

addition, counsel suggested to the jury that it consider and
deliberate personal experiences Step one of the Valdez test
was clearly met.
Troy, at 486.
Similar to Troy, step one of the Valdez test has been met in the
case at bar.
The second prong of the test examines whether the jurors
were likely to have been influenced by the improper remarks of
counsel.

This test requires this court to analyze the strength

of the case put on by the prosecution.

In the case at bar, the

state's case was almost entirely built on the testimony of a
confidential informant, Melva Palmasano.

Every one of the

elements of the crime charged in the information were based on
the testimony of Ms. Palmasano, an unreliable witness.
To avoid repetition in this brief, the weaknesses in Ms.
Palmasano's testimony are discussed in point VI below.

If this

court finds that there is some weakness in the testimony of Melva
Palmasano, a reversal is warranted.

III. THE PROSECUTION ELICITED TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT HAD BEEN
ARRESTED FOR SELLING DRUGS PREVIOUSLY AND THAT SHE AND HER
HUSBAND WERE SELLING ILLEGAL DRUGS.
The second incident of harmful error will be analyzed out of
order.

Chronologically this was the final error which occurred.

Because the analysis of this incident is helpful in considering
the earlier incidents it will be discussed now.
This error occurred during the testimony of Melva Palmasano.
It occurred when the Prosecutor improperly asked her about her
11

motivations for having contacted the police.

The questionable

exchange went as follows:
Q:

Why did you take this information to the police?

A:

Why did I take the information?

Q:

Yes.

A:

Because I felt that we had all been arrested for this
and they were continuing to sell drugs.

With respect to the defendant, the statement of Melva
Palmasano is prejudicial in two respects.

First, it indicates

that defendant and her husband were arrested for selling drugs
previously.

Defendant had never been previously arrested on drug

charges.
Secondly, the statement indicates that the defendant was
continuing to sell drugs after an arrest.

Defendant had never

been arrested for or accused of selling drugs previous to the
case at bar.

Both statements were extremely prejudicial to the

defendant because they tend to inflame the jury, and because they
are not true.
Even though they are untrue, the prejudicial statements made
by Ms. Palmasano fall for purposes of analysis under the
classification of prior bad act evidence.

State v. O'Niel, 848

P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993), provides an excellent comment on how
the admission of improper prior bad act evidence before the jury
must be considered.

When considering the admission of such

evidence, Rules 4 03 and 4 04 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
come into play.

In O'Niel, the court stated:

12

Thus, the procedure this court follows when reviewing the
admission of prior bad act evidence is straight forward.
First, the evidence must, as a matter of law, be admissible
under Rule 404 (b). Second we determine, as a matter of
law, whether the trial court acted reasonably in striking
the probative value versus the prejudicial effect balance
required by Rule 403. If both those standards are met we
will affirm. If we determine either of the first two
standards is not met, we must then determine whether the
admission of the evidence amounted to prejudicial error.
O'Niel, at 699.
In analyzing whether the evidence of defendant's alleged
prior bad acts is admissible Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence must be examined.

Rule 404(b) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b)

(1992).

Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not exclude
evidence unless it fits into an exception.

Relevant evidence is

allowed, other than to show the disposition of the defendant.
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1987).

State v.

Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 546 (Utah 1983).
In the case at bar, the evidence offered in the testimony of
Melva Palmasano fits into one of the exceptions of the rule and
therefore should have been excluded.

This evidence was offered

to inform the jury regarding Ms. Palmasano's motivations for
going to the police.

What may or may not have motivated her is

not relevant.

13

To fit within one of the categories of Rule 404(b) that
allows introduction of prior bad act evidence, the evidence must
go directly to one of the elements of the crime charged in the
information.
Evidence is not admitted merely because it shows a common
plan, scheme or manner of operation. Instead, evidence of a
common plan, scheme or manner of operation is admitted where
it tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged.
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 569 (Utah App. 1991), quoting
State v. Forsvth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176-77 (Utah 1982) .
Because the testimony offered by officer Melva Palmasano was
not admissible under Rule 404(b), it should not have been
offered.
Assuming arguendo that the court holds that the evidence was
admissible under 4 04(b), the next analysis is to determine
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court acted appropriately
in striking the balance between the probative value and
prejudicial effect of the evidence.

This is the analysis which

must be done under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule

403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
There are several factors which must be considered when balancing
probativeness of evidence against its prejudicial effect.
Included in these factors are:
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
14

need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
State v. Schickles, 760 P.2d 291, 296 (Utah 1988).
Applying the Schickles analysis it is easy to conclude that
allowing the jury to hear Melva Palmasano's statements as
motivation was not within the limits of reasonability.

This

testimony accused defendant in front of the jury of having
previously sold drugs, and of continuing to sell drugs after a
previous arrest.

These are unfounded allegations for which the

defendant has never been charged.

The only purpose of these

allegations was to inflame the jury, and to get them to consider
the character of the defendant in making their decision.

This

evidence is not probative of any of the elements of the crime
charged in the information, and is extremely prejudicial to the
defendant.
Because this evidence was more prejudicial than probative,
the court must determine as a final matter whether the jury's
hearing of the evidence constitutes harmful error.
In order to constitute reversible error, the error
complained of must be sufficiently prejudicial that there is
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant in its absence.
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989).

In the case

at bar, the state's case was not strong as it was almost entirely
based on the testimony of an unreliable confidential informant.
To avoid repetition, the problems with the testimony of Melva
Palmasano will be analyzed in point VI below.

If the court finds

that the testimony of Ms. Palmasano is less than compelling and,
15

absent this error, a different result might have occurred, a
reversal is warranted.

IV.

THE OFFICER TESTIFIED IMPROPERLY REGARDING ALLEGED BAD ACTS
OF DEFENDANT.

Another motion for a mistrial based on testimony involving
prior bad acts occurred during the testimony of officer Tompkins.
The exchange went as follows:
Q:

BY MR. ANDERSON:
What reason did she give you
officer why she was giving you this information?

A:

She said that she had been trying to stay off from
drugs for I believe she said two or three weeks,
Donnna was a friend of hers and knew this. That Donna
was still using drugs and trying to get her to use
drugs and that upset her. She also stated that she was
selling drugs to kids that were her kids age. She
didn't think that was right. Basically those were the
two main issues with Mrs. Palmasano.

(Tr. at 135).
The above statement is improper.

Melva Palmisano's motivation

for giving the police information is not relevant.
the fact that she was trying to stay off drugs.

Neither is

The statement

that defendant was using drugs and trying to get her to use drugs
cannot be supported by the record.

The defendant is not charged

with using drugs, only with distributing them.

The allegation

that the defendant was trying to get Melva Palmasano to use drugs
is not supported by the facts.

The record establishes that Melva

contacted the defendant and asked about purchasing drugs.

(Tr.

at 195, 207, 208). There is no record of the defendant initially
contacting her.

16

The statement is also prejudicial because it alleges that
the defendant was selling drugs to kids.

Defendant has never

been charged with distributing controlled substances to children.
Prior to this arrest, defendant had never been charged with
distributing drugs to anyone.

The only purpose of this hearsay

statement was to inflame and prejudice the jury.
The trial court recognized that the statement of the officer
was prejudicial but ordered the comments stricken rather than
granting the motion for a mistrial.

By that time, however, the

jurors had heard the comments and the damage was done.

The trial

court stated:
I am going to deny your Motion for a Mistrial but I am going
to caution you Mr. Anderson that I don't think it is
appropriate to get into some of these areas for the area of
saying for example that she told me she was going to buy
these drugs to sell to minors. I think that is immaterial
and I think it also becomes prejudicial. I think that we
need to stay away from that kind of a situation, I am
allowing you to get into it just far enough to indicate that
there was some conversations, and these are conversations
that this witness has had with his confidential informant.
When the confidential informant gets on the stand and then
that confidential informant she has had conversations with
the defendant that may be another story. At this point and
time I don't think these things should be raised beyond the
fact that I have allowed you to get into the trip to
California but nothing more than that. I am cautioning you
don't explore that any further.
(Tr. at 139, 140).
In many ways the case at bar is similar to State v. Kazda,
382 P.2d 407 (Utah 1963).

In Kazda an F.B.I, officer testified

regarding crimes which the defendant was alleged to have
committed in other states.

In response to an objection the trial

court admonished the jury to disregard the other offenses.
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Despite that instruction, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
conviction finding that admission of the statements of the
officer constituted prejudicial error.

The court stated:

We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial error. It
implied that the defendant was implicated in other crimes,
none of them proven, and could have no other effect than to
degrade the defendant and give to the jury the impression
that he had a propensity for crime. It is true that the
defendant admitted prior felony convictions, but 'we cannot
say with any degree of assurance that there would not have
been a different result' in the absence of such testimony.
Kazda, at 409.
The statements of officer Tompkins constitute evidence of
prior bad acts, and must be analyzed under Rules 403 and 404(b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Because the analysis is exactly

the same as the point above it will not be repeated here.

If the

court finds in its analysis that this evidence was more
prejudicial than probative, and that a different result may have
occurred in its absence, a reversal is warranted.

V.

THE PROSECUTION IMPROPERLY ELICITED TESTIMONY REGARDING A
TRANSCRIPT OF A TAPE WHICH WAS NOT PROPERLY DISCLOSED TO THE
DEFENSE.
The next incident of error in the conduct of the trial in

the case at bar occurred when officer Tompkins made reference to
a transcript of a tape which was supposedly made of the alleged
transaction between the defendant and Melva Palmasano.

The

exchange went as follows:
Q:

Tell the jury the best you can then what was said and
by whom?

A:

Well, there was I have a transcript of the tape here
(indicating) there was quite a bit - 18

Mr. Gaither:

Objection, I have a motion to make at this
time your honor.

(Tr. at 149).
Prior to trial, Defense counsel sent a request for
discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
request.

The prosecution voluntarily complied with this
(R. at 11). Defense counsel later sent a fax to the

prosecution, and also had a telephone conversation with the
prosecution affirming that no tapes were to be used.
150).

(Tr. at

Copies of the transcript were not handed out to counsel

until just prior to the lunch break.

(Tr. at 150).

The nondisclosure of the tapes and transcript occurred
despite the fact that a Rule 16 motion would have required full
disclosure of the materials.

(Tr. at 150).

Regarding

nondisclosure of materials in a voluntary response to a request
for discovery the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
Under our decision in Knight, when a prosecutor undertakes
to respond voluntarily to discovery requests from the
defense, the prosecutor either must produce "all of the
material requested or must explicitly identify those
portions of the request with respect to which no responsive
material will be provided" 734 P.2d at 916-17. This
obligation is ongoing and is justified as a guard against
misleading the defense by an incomplete prosecutorial
response to discovery. If a violation of this duty is
found, the trial court may fashion a remedy under rule
16(g) .
State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv Rep. 23 (Utah 1994), quoting State
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).

In Knight, the Utah Supreme

Court reversed a conviction where the prosecution failed to
properly disclose witnesses who were later used at trial.
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The trial court recognized that the reference to the
transcript and tape were prejudicial to the defendant.
indicated that they were close to a mistrial.
however, grant the motion for a mistrial.

He also

He did not,

(Tr. at 153).

The

trial court did not order the objectionable material stricken.
Where a trial court does not take appropriate measures under Rule
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, a reversal may be
warranted.
...if the trial judge denies the relief requested under Rule
16 (g), that denial may constitute an abuse of discretion
warranting a reversal. An abuse of discretion occurs when,
taking into account any remedial measures ordered by the
trial court, the prejudice to the defendant still satisfies
the standard for reversible error set forth in Rule 30, and
the remedial measures requested but refused would have
obviated this prejudice.
Knight at 918.
Rule 3 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
reversal where there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant."

State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d

1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d
635, 637 (Utah 1982).

The next analysis, therefore, is to

determine whether a more favorable result would have occurred
without the reference to the tape and transcript.
Because the tape and transcript were mentioned and not
struck, the jury was left to speculate on their content.

This is

particularly harmful because in reality, the officer apparently
did not hear a drug transaction on the tape.

At the preliminary

hearing this officer was asked whether he heard any of the
conversation.

He indicated that he had some problems because he
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had to move.
drug purchase.
no."

He was asked whether what he heard sounded like a
This answer was "I don't believe so as I recall

(Tr. at 151).
In further determining whether the mention of the tape and

transcript constituted harmful error, the weaknesses of the
state's case must be considered.

The State primarily relied on a

single witness to make the elements of this charge.

To avoid

repetition, the problems regarding the testimony of this witness
are set forth below.

VI.

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS ERRORS IN THIS TRIAL
WERE PREJUDICIAL AND A DIFFERENT RESULT WAS LIKELY ABSENT
THE ERRORS.
There were four separate instances of error in the conduct

of the trial in the case at bar.
motions for a mistrial.

There were four separate

Arguably each of the instances warranted

the granting of the motion for a mistrial, as each error could
have prejudiced the jury sufficiently that confidence in the
verdict is undermined.

Assuming, arguendo, that the separate

errors, individually, are not sufficient to warrant a mistrial,
they certainly warrant reversal and remand for a new trial when
their cumulative effect is considered.
The proposition for us to decide here is not whether any of
the irregularities herein discussed would separately have
been such as to constitute prejudicial error and require a
new trial. It is recognized that a combination of errors
which, when singly considered might be thought insufficient
to warrant a reversal, might in their cumulative effect do
so.
State v. St. Claire, 282 P.2d 323, 332 (Utah 1955).
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When analyzing multiple errors which have occurred in a
trial, what the court is looking at is whether the cumulative
errors undermine confidence in the verdict.
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).

State v. Dunn, 850

In determining whether

confidence in the verdict may be undermined, what is generally
examined is the overall strength of the case put forward by the
prosecution.

If the case is extremely strong, the verdict can be

sustained despite multiple errors.
multiple errors can require reversal.

If a case is flawed,
In reversing a conviction

after discovering multiple errors the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Alone, this error may have been harmless. However, viewed
in conjunction with the prosecutor's improper argument, the
fact that the evidence in favor of guilt was not strong, and
the fact that these errors impacted Emmett's credibility and
character, which were at the heart of his defense -- there
is a reasonable likelihood that absent the errors a
different result would have occurred. We therefore decline
to accept the reasoning of the trial court that it was led
into error by defense counsel's choice of trial strategy or
that the error was simply harmless. Rather, we conclude
that the error was of sufficient magnitude to warrant a new
trial.
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992).
To determine whether the errors which occurred in the case
at bar were harmful, it is critical to look at the weaknesses in
the State's case.

Basically the entire case is based on the

testimony of Melva Palmasano, who was a less than reliable
witness.
Examination of the record makes it clear that Mrs. Palmasano
was less than reliable.

Ms. Palmasano was the instigator of the

transaction with defendant, and had asked the defendant to supply
her with some methamphetamine.

(Tr. at 195) .
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Ms. Palmasano was

facing a 3rd degree felony for distribution of a controlled
substance at the time this incident occurred.

(Tr. at 195, 196).

She may have therefore viewed the defendant as a competitor.

The

money to purchase the marijuana was not supplied by the police.
(Tr. at 209).

Palmasano testified that she received $5.00

reimbursement for tapes.

In reality she received $50.00.

(Tr.

at 212, 111, 112). She was eventually paid a total of $2500.00
for her role in this transaction.

(Tr. at 214). Her charges

were dismissed as a result of her participation in this incident.
She admitted having had marijuana in her home, and that she was a
marijuana user.

(Tr. at 217, 218). She admitted that she

initiated the transaction with the defendant herself.
219).

(Tr. at

She admitted under oath that on another occasion she lied

to the very officers who were involved in this case.

(Tr. at

223, 244). The officer monitoring the transaction did not hear
what sounded like a drug transaction.

(Tr. at 151). There was

no prior search of the confidential informant or her premises
prior to the transaction.

(Tr. at 167) .

When considering these facts, without the added prejudice to
the defendant of the errors, it is very likely that the jury
could have reached a different conclusion about the evidence.
the jury chose not to believe Melva Palmisano it could have
inferred that:
1. Melva Palmasano was a drug user and dealer who had been
arrested.
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If

2. That she and her husband were facing serious felonycharges .
3. That she believed that if she could implicate someone
else the charges against her could be reduced or dropped.
4. That the defendant was chosen because she was viewed as a
competitor, and was Palmasano's supervisor at work.
5. That Palmasano lied about setting up a transaction with
defendant.
6. That the sale of drugs was faked.
officer did not hear a transaction.

(remember that the
(Tr. at 151.)

7. That Palmasano supplied her own marijuana to the officers
and claimed that it came from defendant.
8. That Palmasano lied to the officers here as she had on
another occasion.
9. That Palmasano was paid $2500.00 for her cooperation and
testimony.
The above requested inferences are all supported by the
evidence from the trial.

Proof of the elements of the crime

charged are almost entirely based on the testimony of Melva
Palmasano.

Without the errors, the jury might well have

concluded that Palmasano was lying and that the defendant should
have been acquitted.
The combination of the numerous errors along with the
weakness of the states case makes this matter similar to State v.
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993).

In Palmer, aggravated

sexual abuse charges were reversed because numerous errors
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combined with a weak case by the state served to undermine the
confidence of the court in the verdict.

In Palmer this court

stated:
While any one of these errors would in itself be harmless,
their cumulative effect is not. The testimony in the case
basically consisted of E.N.'s assertions and descriptions of
sexual encounters and defendant's denial of those
encounters. This case turned primarily on the jury's
assessment of the credibility of E.N. versus the credibility
of the defendant. Because of the nature of the evidence of
guilt and the number of serious errors, we find the errors
cumulatively harmful and cannot say we have confidence in
the verdict.
Palmer, at 350.
Because of the numerous errors in the case at bar, the court
cannot be confident in the verdict of the jury.

For this reason,

defendant respectfully requests that the matter be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Four separate instances of error occurred in this trial
demanding a mistrial be declared.

Each instance taken alone was

sufficient for declaring a mistrial based on the prejudicial
effects of the statement to the defendant.

Certainly, all of the

instances taken together sufficiently prejudiced the defendant's
opportunity to a fair and impartial trial on the merits.
The effect of the improper statements was to sufficiently
taint the jury.

Each of the instances gave the jury information

which was prejudicial to defendant, and which tended to persuade
the jury to convict the defendant on the "bad apple" theory, or,
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in other words, convicting the defendant for bad character rather
than basing the conviction on the evidence.
The prosecutor's reference to a pending charge against
defendant in his opening statement was not needed to establish
foundation, as the prosecutor argued.

The alleged trip to

California to buy drugs was the subject of a separate action then
pending in another division of the Fourth District Court.

It

occurred after the alleged sale of marijuana in this case.

The

remarks sufficiently inflamed the jury and prejudiced the
defendant that defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which was
denied.
The police officer's remark that the defendant was selling
marijuana to minors, a crime of which the defendant has never
been accused, further inflamed the jury and prejudiced the
defendant.

It implied that the defendant was implicated in other

crimes, which were not proven.

Furthermore, it could have no

other effect than to demean the defendant and impress upon the
jury that he had a propensity for crime.

The defense moved for a

mistrial which, again, was denied.
The testimony from an officer that a transcript of a tape
between the informant and the defendant existed also prejudiced
the defendant.

The prosecution voluntarily responded to

discovery requests, however, they failed to give copies of the
transcript to defendant until just prior to the lunch break.
This mislead the defense in its preparation for trial on the
basis that the prosecutor had indicated prior to trial that he
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would not use tapes or transcripts; and this mislead the jury as
to the contents of the tape, which, in fact, were void, according
to the police officer, of any conversation regarding a drug
transaction.
Finally, the testimony from the confidential informant that
defendant and her husband had been arrested for selling drugs
previously, and that they were continuing to sell was prejudicial
in two ways.

First, it indicated that defendant and her husband

were arrested for selling drugs previously; when, in fact,
defendant had never been previously arrested on drug charges.
Second, the statement indicated that the defendant was continuing
to sell drugs after an arrest; when, in fact, defendant had never
been arrested for or accused of selling drugs previous to this
case.
The errors are particularly harmful in this case where usual
procedures were not followed in setting up this alleged drug
transaction.
searched.

The confidential informant and her husband were not

The premises were not searched.

Money was not given

by the police to the confidential informants with which to
purchase the contraband.
charges at the time.

The confidential informant was facing

The confidential informant admitted having

lied to the same police officers on another occasion.

The

confidential informant was eventually paid for her testimony.
The test is whether the jurors were likely to have been
influenced by the improper remarks of counsel.

Analyzing the

strength of prosecution's case, it is apparent that the crux of
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their case was the testimony of a less than reliable confidential
informant who was paid for her testimony in both money and
dismissal of pending charges.

The defense strategy at trial was

to damage the credibility of the confidential informant and make
the jury believe that she may have fabricated the story.

The

confidential informant's credibility was damaged, and without the
additional damage which came from the improper evidence and
statement, defendant may not have been convicted.
Defendant respectfully requests that the matter be reversed
and remanded for a new trial.

DATED this ffWi. day

of March, 1995.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C.

BY
DONALD E . MCENDLESS
J . GRANT MOODY
Attorneys for Defendant

28

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following this /HlK day of
March, 1995:
JAN GRAHAM
CRIMINAL APPEALS DIVISION
236 State Capital Bldg.
Rm. #124
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114

31

APPENDIX 1

29

Thermographic tests: admissibility of test results in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th
1105.
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143.
Products liability: admissibility of experimental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence

of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897.
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927.
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note
to Fedeial Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Balancing test.
Bias.
Circumstantial evidence.
Credibility of witness.
Cumulative evidence.
Determination of admissibility.
Expert testimony.
Film of murder scene.
Guilty plea.
Harmless error.
Impeachment of witness.
Inflammatory evidence.
Offensive remarks.
Other offenses.
Photographic evidence.
Prior convictions.
—Impeachment.
Psychiatric history and drug abuse.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Tape recordings.
—Defendant's admissions.
—Videotapes in pornography trial.
Unfairly prejudicial.
Victim's testimony.
Cited.
Balancing test.
The balancing test of this rule excludes matter of scant or cumulative probative force,
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. State v. Bartlev. 784 P.2d 1231

Bias.
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is
limited by this rule. State v. Hackford, 737
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
Circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant,
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced
by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the
issues before the jury, or in creating an undue
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.,
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Credibility of witness.
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial
judge to substitute his assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not
find it credible. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036,108 S.
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988).
Cumulative evidence.
While there may have been little reason to
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded
conversations between the defendant and a
government informant because the evidence
was cumulative, their admission was not prejudicial because the transcripts merely repeated
the informant's in-court testimony. State v.
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 1985).
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COLLATERAL, KEJEKEINUJKS

Utah Law Review. — Chapman v. State:i:
Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony — An Issuee
of Admissibility or Credibility, 1983 Utah L.i.
Rev. 381.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientificc
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah1
L. Rev. 839.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-"
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1987 Utah L.'•
Rev. 137.
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child
Abuse Litigation, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 479.
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting
"Bad Character" Evidence During the GuiltI
Phase of Criminal Trials — State v. Bishop,
'
1989 Utah L Rev. 1013.
State v. Rimmasch: Utah's Threshold Admissibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Profile Evidence, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 641.
J o u r n a l of Contemporary Law. — Comment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the>
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81L
(1989).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence>
§ 253 et seq.

C J . S . — 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 166.
A.L.R. — Noncharacter witnesses in civil
case, limiting number of, 5 AJL.R.3d 169.
Noncharacter witnesses in criminal case,
limiting number of, 5 A.L.R.3d 238.
Character or reputation witnesses, propriety
and prejudicial effect of trial court's limiting
number of, 17 A.L.R.3d 327.
Admissibility of polygraph or similar lie detector test results, or willingness to submit to
test, on issues of coverage under insurance policy, or insurer's good-faith belief that claim
was not covered, 7 A.L.R.5th 143.
Sufficiency of evidence that witness in criminal case was hypnotized, for purposes of determining admissibility of testimony given under
hypnosis or of hypnotically enhanced testimony, 16 A.L.R.5th 841.
Evidence offered by defendant at federal
criminal trial as inadmissible, under Rule 403
of Federal Rules of Evidence, on ground that
probative value is substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
or misleading the jury, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 700.
Key Numbers. — Evidence *=> 143.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim. Provisions of this
rule apply to character evidence to prove conduct, as distinguished from proof of character
where character is an essential element of a
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was
comparable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d
703 (Utah 1977) (character evidence as to the
character of the victim of a homicide was admissible to rebut the defendant's contention
that the deceased was the aggressor). One significant difference between this rule and Rule
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there

is no provision for the use of character evidence
in civil cases, except where character is the
ultimate issue in question, whereas Rule 47
authorized the use of character evidence in
civil cases not only on the ultimate issue but
where otherwise substantively relevant. See
Boyce, Character Evidence: The Substantive
Use, 4 Utah Bar J. 13, 18-19 (1976). However,
Rule 48, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly excluded character evidence with respect to a trait as to care or skill. The Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence
concluded that the remaining justification for
the admission of character evidence was so insignificant that character evidence in civil
cases should not be admitted unless it was in
issue.

Subdivision (b) is comparable to Rule 55,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982). See Boyce,
Evidence of Other Crimes or Wrongdoing, 5
Utah Bar J. 31 (1977).

Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Application of rule.
Character of accused.
Character of codefendant.
Common plan or scheme.
Harmless error.
Identity.
Knowledge and intent.
Limiting instruction.
Other crimes.
—Defense.
Proof of motive.
Severance.
Specific instances of conduct.
Victim's character.
Cited.
Application of rule.
Admissibility of evidence of an act that constitutes an early step in the effectuation of the
crime for which defendant is presently charged
and tried is not governed by this rule. State v.
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
This rule allows prior bad act evidence in a
criminal trial when it is offered to show any
element of the alleged crime. Prior bad act evidence is only excluded if the sole reason it is
being offered is to prove bad character or to
show that a person acted in conformity with
that character. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585
(Utah 1993).
Character of accused.
When it becomes apparent from the evidence
that the defendant is relying upon the defense
of entrapment, the State must be allowed to
present any evidence in impeachment or rebuttal that would show the defendant's disposition
to commit the crime charged, including prior
acts of crime or misconduct. State v. Hansen,
588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1978).
By offering witnesses as to his reputation as
a truthful person, defendant opens the door for
the prosecution to impeach his character witnesses; prosecution may attempt to discredit
the testimony of such witnesses by showing
that they have not heard specific reports that
are relevant to defendant's reputation, but it
cannot present evidence of the truth or falsity
of specific beliefs or reports pertaining to that
reputation. State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah
1981).
While evidence of defendant's criminal character may be, and generally is, excluded under
Subdivision (b) of this rule when such evidence
is elicited or offered by the prosecution to prove
its case-in-chief, the same evidence may be admissible when the responsibility for its introduction may be traced to the defendant. State
v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1984).
Since a defendant's character is not an element of the crime of sexual abuse of a child,

a defendant charged with such crime for admission of past instances of conduct relating to
his "reputation for sexual morality." State v.
Mixler, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985).
Character of codefendant.
Proffered testimony as to codefendant's impulsiveness had no bearing on defendant's
guilt or innocence and was not admissible.
State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 1983).
Common plan or scheme.
In prosecution for violation of § 76-6-404,
where it was alleged that defendant had, without authorization, taken a check payable to his
employer which came into his possession in the
course of his employment, endorsed it in the
employer's name, and deposited it to an account he controlled, and the defense was based
on a claim of right, it was proper to permit
introduction of evidence of defendant's conversion of other funds belonging to his employer,
since such testimony could establish a common
plan or scheme and show a motive for the offense at issue, upon which the jury could base
an assessment of the veracity of defendant's
testimony. State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah
1977).
Evidence of a prior scheme involving selling
fruit vending machines and keeping the purchase money without any intent to deliver the
machines to the purchasers was admissible to
establish defendant's intent and modus
operandi in present charge of theft by deception involving a similar scheme to sell fruit
vending machines without any intent to deliver such machines. State v. Kerekes, 622
P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
Evidence is not admitted merely because it
shows a common plan, scheme, or manner of
operation. Instead, evidence of a common plan,
scheme, or manner of operation is admitted
where it tends to prove some fact material to
the crime charged. State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d
1172 (Utah 1982).
Evidence of defendant's possession of marijuana, similarly packaged, twelve days prior to
the offense charged, was properly admitted,
where the contested evidence was particularly
probative on the issue of constructive possession and was illustrative of defendant's common plan of marijuana distribution. State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Harmless error.
Hearsay statements and other evidence relating to defendant's prior illegal activity,
while inadmissible under the rules of evidence,
was not necessarily harmful error, because it
was conceivable that defense counsel made a
deliberate and wise tactical choice in not focusing jury attention on them by objecting. State
v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1988).
A d m i s s i o n of defpnftant'fi ro-irw A<rAi*«~~ .

